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Executive summary
Despite being two and a half years into an economic recovery, many of the
problems that beset working Americans in the 200 I recession and protracted
jobless recovery persist today. The 2001 downturn stopped and even reversed
most of the positive economic trends that characterized the latter 1990s, a pe-
riod when historically tight labor markets ensured that the growth of productiv-
ity was, for the first time in two decades, broadly shared throughout the income
scale. Through the late 1990s, real wages grew rapidly not just for high-wage
workers, but also for those in middle- and lower-wage jobs. Incomes rose across
the board, poverty rates fell quickly, and the growth of inequality was signifi-
cantly dampened.
In contrast, since 2000, unemployment has been high (relative to the preced-
ing period offull employment) and not responsive to the productivity growth that
has occurred. In fact, the unemployment rate of 5.6% in mid-2004 stood at pre-
cisely the same level as that of November 2001, when the recovery began. The
great American job machine was uniquely dormant for almost two years into this
recovery, with consistent job creation finally occurring in the fall of 2003. Since
then, the U.S. economy has added 1.5 million jobs, yet it remains 1.2 million jobs
below the last business cycle's peak employment level in March 2001. The United
States has been tracking employment statistics since 1939, and never in history
has it taken this long to regain the jobs lost over a downturn.
This persistent labor market slack and its negative effect on wages and
incomes is a central theme of this book and is explored throughout the chapters
that follow. Yet this book's analysis goes far beyond a review of the past few
years, as it explores in great detail the history of the U.S. economy from the
perspective of working families. As with most economic analyses, the focus is
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on unemployment, jobs, gross domestic product, productivity-the usual set of
indicators of interest to those who folJow economics.
The analysis does not stop there, and for a very important reason: the liv-
ing standards of working families depend not only on overalJ growth, but also
on how that growth is distributed. For that reason, every chapter in this book
focuses far less on statis6cal averages than it does on the richly varied set of
economic outcomes that can be viewed through the lenses of race, gender, fam-
ily type, and wage/salary/wealth status. In this regard, the inequality of eco-
nomic outcomes is of great concern to us, and we pay particular attention to its
evolution, both in the distant past and in recent months.
The book's chapters-summarized below-provide a detailed portrait of
the economy and its relationship with working Americans and their families.
Each chapter provides a history-in-numbers that focuses on incomes, wages,
jobs, wealth, poverty, variations between regions, and comparisons with inter-
national peers.
Family income: higher inequality leads to uneven progress
The full employment economy of the latter 1990s ushered in a unique period of
fast and broadly shared income growth. Not only did middle-income families
get ahead over those years, but the least-advantaged families did the best in
terms of income growth. From 1995 to 2000, median family income grew at an
annual rate of 2.1 % for whites, 2.9% for blacks, and 4.6% for Hispanics.
The 2001 recession and subsequent jobless recovery halted these gains.
Real median family income fell by over $1,300 (2.4%) from 2000 to 2002 (in
2003 dollars), and the loss of employment opportunities alone explains 80% of
the decline in middle-class family incomes over these years. In percentage
terms, lower income families took a bigger hit, as incomes at the 20th percen-
tile (where 80% of families have higher incomes) fell 4.2%. Wealthy families
also lost ground, as the bursting of a stock market bubble led to large losses in
capital gains. Hours of work fell for married-couple families at all income
levels, as did their real incomes.
As noted, the broad-based income growth of the latter 1990s was a unique
period given income trends over the past 25 years. Prior to that period of full
employment, income growth was highly unequal. Between 1979 and 2000, for
example, the real income of households in the lowest fifth (the bottom 20% of
earners) grew 6.4%, while that of households in the top fifth (the top 20% of
earners) grew 70%, with the top 1% achieving real income gains of 184%. In
contrast to this unequal pattern of growth, in the 1950s and 1960s, real incomes
just about doubled for each income fifth.
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The extent to which middle-class incomes have diverged from productiv-
ity growth is intimately related to this historical perspective on income in-
equality. Between 1947 and 1973 productivity and real median family in-
come both grew 104%, a golden age of growth for both variables. Over this
era, there could be no doubt that the typical family fully benefited from pro-
ductivity growth.
Yet starting in the mid-1970s, this lockstep relationship broke down. From
1973 to 2002, median family income grew at about one-third the rate of pro-
ductivity (22% versus 65%). That is, while faster productivity growth led to a
larger economic pie, growing inequality meant that slices were divided up such
that some income classes-those at the top of the income scale-claimed most
of the income growth.
Thus, there now exists far more income inequality in the United States than
has been the case in earlier periods. Some commentators have downplayed this
problem by citing supposedly high levels of income mobility, such that those
who begin at the low end of the income scale have a strong likelihood of leap-
frogging to the top. The evidence, however, contradicts this contention. Of
those who started out in the lowest income fifth in the late 1980s, more than
half (53%) were still there in the late 1990s, and another 24% had climbed only
to the next fifth, meaning that 77% of those who started out in the low end of
the income scale remained there a decade later. Furthermore, the rate of mobil-
ity has slowed slightly over time. In the 1970s, 49% of families that started out
in the bottom fifth were still there 10 years later.
Once all income sources are taken into account, including capital gains,
the extent of income concentration at the end of the last business cycle was
remarkably high by historical standards. Using newly available income data
that goes all the way back to 1913, income in 2000 was only slightly less con-
centrated among the top 1% of households than during the run-up to the Great
Depression, which was the worst period of uneven income concentration in the
last century. In 2000, the top 1% held 21.7% of total income, compared to
22.5% in 1929. Chapter 7, which focuses on international comparisons, shows
such high levels of inequality to be uniquely American.
Recent regressive changes in federal taxation will further boost income
inequality. For households in the top 1% of the income scale, the full tax sav-
ings from the cuts that were made from 2001 to 2003 were about $67,000; for
middle-income families, the cuts amounted to just under $600; and for the low-
est 20%, the savings was $61. The effect of these cuts has thus been to redis-
tribute after-tax income up the income scale, leading to an inequality-exacer-
bating transfer of 0.8% of total, after-tax household income from the bottom
99% to the top 1%.
3
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Most recently, profits and capital incomes appear to have recovered from
their Josses in the early years of the de.cade. Since the first quarter of 2001,
virtually all (98.5%) of the real income growth in the corporate sector has ac-
crued to capital income (profits, interest, and dividend payments), a hugely
disproportionate share when considering that capital income comprised just
] 6.3% of the total corporate income when the recession started in early 200].
Finally, the necessary strategy for income growth for many middle-in-
come families has been to devote more hours to work in the paid labor market
than in the past. Largely due to the increased labor supply of wives, married
couples with children in the middle-income fifth, for example, were working
500 hours more per year in 2000 than in 1979-the equivalent of ]2 and a
half more full-time weeks per year. Because of these wives' contributions,
instead of growing only 5% in real terms, middle-class family income grew
24%.
Wages: battered by labor slack
Because wages and salaries make up roughly three-fourths of total family in-
come (the proportion is even higher among the broad middle class), wage trends
are the primary determinant of income growth and income inequality trends.
This chapter examines and explains the trends in wage growth and wage in-
equality of the last few decades up through 2003, focusing particularly on the
CUITentbusiness cycle, from 2000 to 2003, and the earlier cycles over the 1979-
89 and 1989-2000 periods. The most recent wage trends, through early 2004,
are examined in this book's Introduction.
The wage story of the last few years is mixed. The strong wage growth of
the late 1990s continued into 2002, despite the rising unemployment from 2000
to 2002. However, the high and continuous labor slack of the early 2000s even-
tually knocked down wage growth, lowering the yearly growth of real median
hourly wages over the 2000-03 period by 1.0% among women and 1.5% among
men. The persistent labor slack affected lower-wage workers even more-knock-
ing yearly wage growth down 1.5% and 2.2%, respectively, among low-wage
women and men. The consequence of this high and persistent labor slack has
been to reestablish a growing wage inequality between low- and middle-wage
workers, a phenomenon not seen since the late 1980s.
The wage story of the past quarter century has three predominant themes.
First, an era of stagnant and falling wages gave way to one of strong wage
growth. Wages were stagnant overall and median wages fell from the early
1970s to 1995. After 1995, wages changed course, rising strongly in response
to persistent low unemployment and the faster productivity growth relative to
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the 1973-95 period. Second, the pattern of wage growth has shifted. In the
1980s wage inequality widened dramatically and, coupled with stagnant aver-
age wages, brought about widespread erosion of real wages. Wage inequality
continued its growth in the 1990s but took a different shape: a continued growth
in the wage gap between top and middle earners, but a shrinking wage gap
between middle and low earners. Since 1999, however, wage inequality has
been growing between the top and the middle but has held steady between the
middle and the bottom. A third theme is the critical role played by rising unem-
ployment in raising wage inequality and the role played by low unemployment
in boosting wage growth overall, but particularly at the bottom.
The trends in average wage growth-the slowdown in the 1970s and the
pick-up in the mid-1990s through the early 2000s-can be attributed to corre-
sponding changes in productivity growth. Productivity accelerated in the mid-
1990s, and its growth continued into the current recession, leading to histori-
caIIy high growth in average wages. But as Chapter 1 shows, income shifted
from labor to capital in the mid-1990s though labor's income shares rebounded
in the last few years of the boom. In the 2000-03 period income shifted ex-
tremely rapidly and extensively from labor compensation to capital income
(profits and interest), so the benefits of faster productivity growth went dispro-
portionately, in fact completely, to capital (see the Introduction).
Explaining the shifts in wage inequality requires attention to several fac-
tors that affect low-, middle-, and high-wage workers differently. The experi-
ence of the late 1990s should remind us of the great extent to which a low
unemployment rate benefits workers, especially low-wage earners. Correspond-
ingly, the high levels of unemployment in the early and mid-1980s and in re-
cent years disempowered wage earners and provided the context in which other
forces-specifically, a weakening of labor market institutions and globaliza-
tion-could drive up wage inequality. Significant shifts in the labor market,
such as the weakening of unions and the severe drop in the real value of the
minimum wage, can explain one-third of the growing wage inequality. Simi-
larly, the increasing globalization of the economy-specifically with regard to
immigration, trade, and capital mobility-and the employment shift toward
lower-paying service industries (such as retail trade) and away from manufac-
turing can explain, in combination, another third of the total growth in wage
inequality. Macroeconomic factors also played an important role: as high un-
employment in the early 1980s greatly increased wage inequality, the low un-
employment of the late 1990s reduced it. High unemployment has renewed
growing wage inequality since 2000.
The shape of wage inequality shifted in the late 1980s as the gap at the
bottom-i.e., the 50/10 gap between middle-wage workers at the 50th percen-
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tile and low-wage workers at the 10th-began to shrink. However, over the last
few years, this progress against wage inequality at the bottom has been halted
among men, and wage inequality among women has resumed its growth. This
reversal partially results from the rise in unemployment and is partially due to
the continued drop in the real value of the minimum wage. The greatest in-
crease in wage inequality at the bottom occurred among women and corre-
sponded to the fall in the minimum wage over the 1980s, the high unemploy-
ment of the early 1980s, and the expansion of low-wage retail jobs. The positive
trend in the wage gap over the 1990s owes much to increases in the minimum
wage, low unemployment, and the slight, relative contraction in low-paying
retail jobs in the late 1990s. The wage gap at the top-the 95/50 gap between
high- and middle-wage earners-continued its steady growth in the 1990s and
early 2000s but at a slightly slower pace than in the 1980s. The continuing
influence of globalization, de-unionization, and the shift to lower-paying ser-
vice industries ("industry shifts") can explain the continued growth of wage
inequality at the top.
There is a popular notion that the growth of wage inequality reflects prima-
rily a technology-driven increase in demand for "educated" or "skilled" work-
ers. Yet economists have found that the overall impact of technology on the
wage and employment structure was no greater in the 19808 or 1990s than in
the 1970s. Moreover, skill demand and technology have little relationship to
the growth of wage inequality within the same group (i.e., workers with similar
levels of experience and education), and this within-group inequality was re-
sponsible for half of the overall growth of wage inequality in the 1980s and
1990s. Technology has been and continues to be an important force, but there
was no "technology shock" in the 1980s or 1990s and no ensuing demand for
"skill" that was not satisfied by the continuing expansion of the educational
attainment of the workforce.
The conventional story about technology leading to increased demand
for skills and the erosion of wages among the less-skilled does not readily
explain the pattern of growth in wage inequality. In particular, the late 1990s
are seen as a period of rapid technological change, yet during that period
wage inequality diminished at the bottom. Similarly, education differentials
grew slowly during most of the 1990s and declined in the early 2000s, a trend
incompatible with rapid technological change driving up demand for skills.
The decline in the wage payoff for experience in the later 1990s also runs
counter to the technology story. Moreover, it was the growth of wage in-
equality among workers of similar education and experience, not easily linked
to technology, which accounted for all of the wage inequality growth since
1995.
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Despite the strong wage improvements starting in 1995, it was not until
1997 that the wage level for middle-wage workers (the median hourly wage)
jumped above its 1979 level. Wage growth was very strong in the late 1990s, a
period of broad-based wage growth (for the first time in several decades) that
resulted from faster productivity and persistent low unemployment.
As for benefit coverage, it declined through the early 2000s. In contrast, in
the 1990s, there were modest extensions of employer-provided health insur-
ance coverage for the bottom 20%, while erosion of coverage continued for
middle- and high-wage workers. Health insurance coverage declined for all
wage groups in the 2000-02 period. After rising over the 1990s, pension cover-
age receded in the 2000-02 recession, leaving overall pension coverage at only
45.5%, or 5.1 percentage points less than the 50.6% coverage of 1979. In other
words, less than half the workforce is covered by employer-provided pensions.
Unionized workers earn higher wages, as is well known, but it is also true
that they enjoy a premium in every dimension of the compensation package.
Unionized workers are 28.2% more likely to be covered by employer-provided
health insurance. Unionized employers also provide better health insurance-
they pay an 11.1% higher share of single-worker coverage and a 15.6% higher
share of family coverage. Moreover, deductibles are $54, or 18.0%, less for
union workers. Finally, union workers are 24.4% more likely to receive health
insurance coverage in their retirement.
The rising trade deficit was responsible for a major loss of jobs in the 1990s,
especially in manufacturing (over 4 million jobs lost between 1989 and 2002).
The trade impact over the last 10 years was more evenly spread over the
workforce, affecting college and other workers in rough proportions to their
share of the workforce. The issue of the offshoring of white-collar technical
and professional jobs to low-wage countries has become prominent. Though
hard data on these trends are not available, information in software and other
industries suggests that these trends are not trivial.
As the wage of the typical worker fell in the early 1990s and rose in the
latter 1990s, executive pay soared. From 1989 to 2000, the wage of the median
chief executive officer grew 79.0%, and average compensation grew 342%.
CEO compensation, however, declined 36.0% between 2000 and 2003, reflect-
ing the fall in stock values and the value of stock options available to CEOs.
This decline affected only the very highest paid CEOs, as those at the median
and the 25th and 75th percentiles saw increases (16.1 % at the median). Never-
theless, CEOs in 2003 still made 185 times as much as a typical worker, whereas
in 1965, CEOs made 26 times more than a typical worker. This level of execu-
tive pay is a distinctly American phenomenon: U.S. CEOs make three times as
much as their counterparts abroad.
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The jobs of the future will not be far different than the CUlTentjobs avail-
able. The change in occupation mix will raise annual wages by just 1% over 10
years. Future jobs will require more education credentials but not to any great
extent. The occupational composition of jobs in 2012 wil1 require that 27.9%
of the workforce have at least a col1ege degree, just one percentage point more
than the 26.9% of workers who held college degrees in 2002.
Jobs: persistent jobless recovery follows 2001 recession
The 2001 recession and subsequent prolonged weak recovery brought an end
to an expansion that proved historically unique in the extent to which it lifted
the economic prospects of American workers. Employment opportunities in-
creased considerably during the tight labor market of the 1990s, especially for
traditionally disadvantaged groups, including women, African Americans, and
Hispanics. Overall, low unemployment over the second half of the 1990s
strengthened workers' bargaining power as many employers had to compete
for workers. This in turn spulTed strong wage and income gains over the latter
half of the 1990s economic boom.
March 2001 marked the official beginning of the last recession, initiating a
time of higher unemployment and labor slack that resulted in a substantial
amount of underutilized labor. While the unemployment rate was low relative
to past recessions, the rate continued to increase two years after the recovery
began. In March 2001 the unemployment rate was 4.3%; it trended upward
until June 2003 when it reached 6.3%, and it was most recently (June 2004)
5.6%. From December 2003 until June 2004, the unemployment rate has been
at an unyielding 5.6% or 5.7%.
Due to the lack of job opportunities, many potential job seekers left the
labor market over this period, and were hence not counted in the unemploy-
ment rate. Thus, throughout the recession and jobless recovery, there was a
persistent decrease in the share of the adult population working or looking
for work (known as the labor force participation rate). In March 2001 the
labor force participation rate was 67.1 %. It trended downward until it hit
65.9% in February 2004-a IS-year low-and it was 66.0% by mid-2004.
Factoring in the decreased labor force participation rate and assuming these
workers would have been unemployed had they been in the labor force, the -
unemployment rate would currently be 7.2%-substantially higher than the
official 5.6% rate.
The lack of job creation has been unprecedented in this latest recovery-
which is why the recovery was deemed a "jobless" one. A jobless recovery
occurs when an economy begins to expand (as defined by the National Bureau
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of Economic Research) but businesses continue to shed jobs as if the economy
were still in recession. During the 2001 recession, the economy lost 1.6 million
nonfarm payroll jobs. A severe jobless recovery, during which an additional
870,000 jobs were lost, followed the recession and lasted 21 months (Novem-
ber 2001 until August 2003). In June 2004 (the most recent data available) the
economy was still down 1.2 million jobs from the March 2001 peak-an un-
paralleled occurrence this far into a recovery.
The 2001 downturn, as usual, disproportionately affected minorities and
workers with less education: in 2001 African Americans had an unemployment
rate of 8.7%, compared to the overall average of 4.8%. However, the 2001
downturn also adversely affected other groups usually thought to have some
protection against recessions. For example, the employment to population ratio
for young college graduates hit a 30-year low during the recovery. The reces-
sion and its aftermath affected a broadly diverse contingent of workers: young
and old, less educated to highly educated, laborers to professionals. Manufac-
turing jobs were lost for a record 41 consecutive months. However, significant
job loss occurred in other occupations, such as the information technology sec-
tor. The stock market bubble burst in 2000, which left many white-collar work-
ers unemployed. In addition, firms' demand for offshoring is increasing. Tech-
nological advancements coupled with a supply shock of skilled labor that resulted
from the opening up of global labor markets have made this labor practice
possible.
The lack of job creation has led to unemployment spells that are much
longer than would be expected given the level of unemployment. In 2003,
when unemployment was 6.1 %, long-term unemployment (i.e., unemployment
lasting 27 or more weeks) and the average duration of unemployment spells
were at levels historically associated with much higher levels of unemploy-
ment. In 2003, for example, the share of long-term unemployed as a percent of
total unemployment was 22.1 %-the highest since 1983, when the unemploy-
ment rate was 9.9%. In addition, the problem oflongjobless spells was broad-
based, as the number of college-educated workers unemployed for long peri-
ods increased by 300% from 2001 to 2003.
Despite the return of job growth in September 2003, the labor market as
of mid-2004 remains slack, and the benefits that accompanied the tight labor
market of the 1990s remain elusive. As we stress in the Introduction that
follows, this persistent weakness has led much of the growth that has oc-
CUrredover the jobless recovery to flow to profits, leaving little for compen-
sation. Whether we soon return to a more equitable job market remains an
open question.
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Wealth: persistent inequality
The income data examined in Chapter J represent the How of family's eco-
nomic resources. Wealth, however, is the stock of a family's income and as-
sets, minus their debt. Its distribution is highly unequal in the United States,
far more so than income. For example, in 200J (the most recent data available)
the wealthiest 1% of aU households controlJed over 33% of national wealth,
while the bottom 80% of households held only 16%. The share of average
wealth by wealth class shows that wealth inequality is stark and persistent. This
skewed distribution is, in part perpetuated by the passing of wealth from gen-
eration to generation. The level of wealth a family acquires is, to a large degree,
determined by where it starts On the wealth ladder. Wealth determines how
adequately a household can smooth consumption when financial emergencies
arise. Those with little wealth can be financially devastated by any economic
setback. It is a difficult chalJenge for middle- and lower-income families to
accumulate ample wealth.
Some debt can be acquired for a worthy cause such as home ownership
(mortgage debt) or school loans, but such debt can be hard to acquire for
those who presumably have the greatest needs for such loans. Other types of
debt, such as the use of high-inter est-bearing credit cards, can be much more
problematic-especially when balances accrue to meet day-to-day living ex-
penses.
Several key features about American wealth stand out. For example, 17.6%
of households had zero or negative net wealth in 2001. There are vast differ-
ences when race is factored in; for instance, 13.1 % of white households versus
30.9% of African American households have zero or negative net wealth. Me-
dian wealth for African Americans was $10,700 in 2001, just 10% of the corre-
sponding median for whites.
The ownership of stocks is particularly unequal. Given the increases in stock
ownership over the last decade, along with the boom of the 1990s, it may be
surprising that roughly half of Americans still do not participate in the stock
market, either directly or indirectly through the likes of mutual funds. The top
1% of stockowners held 33.6% of all stocks, by value, while the bottom 80% of
stockholders owned just 10.7% of total stock value in 2001. On average, the
wealthiest 1% of households owned $3.5 million in stocks, while the bottom
40% of households owned an average of $1,800 in stocks. While48.1 % of house-
holds had no stock investment, another 11.8% had less than $5,000 of stock,
leaving only 40.1 % of alJ households with $5,000 or more in stock assets.
It follows, then, that the wealthiest households gain the most from the
growth in the stock market. From 1989 to 2001, the top 10% of wealth hold-
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ers reaped 74.9% of the growth in stocks, while the bottom 80% received
11.1 %.
Home ownership-the most important source of assets for most American
families-continued the upward trend that started in 1994, especially among
nonwhite households. In 1994 the rate of home ownership was 64%, and it
increased to 68.3% in 2003. However, home ownership rates vary considerably
by income and race. Only 50.9% of those in the bottom quarter of the income
distribution owned their homes in 2001, while 88% in the top quarter of the
income distribution owned homes. Blacks and Hispanics, while slowly increasing
home ownership rates, still lag behind whites. In 2003, 72.1 %, 48.1 %, and
46.7% of whites, blacks, and Hispanics, respectively, owned homes. There is a
lot of room for improvement in home ownership rates for racial minorities and
those at the bottom of the income distribution.
The aftermath of the 1990s boom left most Americans better prepared for
retirement than before: in 2001, almost three out of four Americans will be able
to replace at least half of their pre-retirement income with income from Social
Security, pensions, and defined-contribution plans. This was a marked improve-
ment from 1998, when 57.5% could expect to replace half of their CUITentin-
come in retirement. It will be interesting to see if this improvement will hold up
in the 2004 survey.
Household debt as a share of assets was, on average, 18% in 2003. As
expected, debt burdens continued to plague lower-income families dispropor-
tionately, although debt burdens for the typical household decreased slightly.
By 2001, middle-income families had a slight increase in debt, but experienced
larger increases in stocks, assets, and overall net worth. Conversely, the most
recent government data show that 16% of households in the $20,000-$39,999
range had debt-service obligati6ns that exceeded 40% of their income, while
11.7% of these households had at least one bill that was more than 60 days past
due. Moreover, the official report of debt by the Federal Reserve Board has
undoubtedly understated serious financial hardships-akin to debt-incurred
by households with high levels of financial insecurity. These households in-
creasingly access loans and money through nontraditional or predatory lending
institutions such as pawn shops and check-cashing centers. Additionally, de-
spite the robust state of the economy, personal bankruptcy rates reached all-
time highs in 2001. Next year, the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Con-
SUmerFinances will release data from its 2004 survey, at which time we will be
able to determine the longer-term impact that the stock market crash of 2000
had on household finances.
11
THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA
Poverty: rising in this business cycle
While America is the richest of the industrialized nations, it has always, to a
greater or lesser degree over time, suffered the problem of poverty amidst pros-
perity. In recent decades, the growtl1 of inequality has meant that much of the
economic growth that did occur was channeled to higher income families, while
incomes at the bottom stagnated. For example, the official poverty rate-the
share of Americans living in households with incomes below the federal pov-
erty threshold-was about the same in 1973 (11.1 %) as in 2000 01.3 %), de-
spite the fact that real per capita income grew 66% over that period.
To some, the fact that a bit more than one-tenth of Americans-12. I %, or
34.6 million persons in 2002-face material deprivation may be disheartening,
but not particularly alarming. Yet, like many other poverty analysts, we strongly
believe that the official poverty statistics uriderestimate the extent of material
hardship in America. The thresholds used to determine poverty status, critiqued
in detail below, were developed half a century ago, and they have only been
updated for inflation. In 2003, for example, a single parent with two children
is considered poor if the family income (before taxes bur counting cash trans-
fers like welfare benefits) is below $14,824; for two parents with two children,
the income threshold is $18,660.
Various alternative measures are used in this chapter to expand the scope
of poverty analysis. One useful measure simply doubles the poverty thresh-
olds. This seems arbitrary-if the official thresholds are so inferior, what is
gained by simply doubling them? In fact, the Economic Policy Institute's own
work on family budgets reveals that twice the poverty threshold corresponds
quite closely to more rigorously defined measures of a family's ability to meet
its basic needs. These family budget thresholds are developed by adding up
the costs of basic consumption components, including food, shelter, clothing,
health care, taxes, and child care.
Regardless of the metric, a few trends clearly emerge. First, after making
impressive progress against poverty in the 1960s, the trend stalled and then
generally drifted up from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s. The 1995-2000
period was one of dramatic progress, as poverty fell by 2.5 percentage points,
and twice-poverty by 4.3 points (corresponding to 4.8 million fewer poor and
8.6 million fewer twice-poor persons). The 2001 recession and jobless recov-
ery partially reversed these gains.
As is always the case in a recession, the ranks of the poor and near-poor
expanded in the recent downturn, as poverty rates rose from 11.3 % in 2000 to
12.1 % in 2002, while twice-poverty rates went from 29.3% to 30.5%. These
rate increases translate into about 3 million more officially poor, and 6 mil-
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lion more near-poor over this two-year period. In addition, this chapter ex-
amines the extent to which the safety net helped to catch those economically
vulnerable families hurt by the recession. Focusing on low-income single-
mother families, for example, shows that welfare benefits-which fell steeply
throughout the latter 1990s-continued to slide in the recession, thus failing
to play their historical countercyclical role. Furthermore, the slowing economy
led to a significant reduction in the hours worked by these women, and that,
in turn, led to lower earnings and less income from the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), a generous wage-subsidy that is key to lifting the incomes of
low-income working families. In this regard, the safety net is less
countercyclical than it used to be for some groups of poor and near-poor
persons (a related finding is that the EITC fails to reach many families be-
tween the one and two-times poverty range).
Taking a longer-term view, this chapter examines which factors might
best explain the lack of progress in reducing poverty over the past 30 years.
The growth of inequality and weak low-wage labor markets have certainly
played primary roles. Throughout the 1980s, when poverty rates were par-
ticularl y unresponsive to growth, the effect of inequality was to drive poverty
up by 2.9 percentage points (poverty rose 1.1 points over the decade because
other factors, such as the improved education of low-income family heads,
offset the inequality effect). That effect was significantly dampened in the
1990s, but as the economy moved into the next business cycle, growing in-
equality appears poised to return, creating potentially strong headwinds against
poverty reduction.
Another factor implicated in much research on this topic is the increase in
mother-only families. This view emphasizes the increase in the share of such
families since at any given point in time, they have considerably lower income
and higher poverty rates than families with two earners. Although this argu-
ment may have some merit, the upward pressure on poverty rates by the forma-
tion of single-parent families has diminished considerably over time, while the
economic determinants-growth, inequality, and unemployment-have, if any-
thing, grown more important. Over the 1970s, for example, had all else re-
mained constant, the shift to more mother-only families would have contrib-
uted two percentage points to the poverty rate according to our decomposition
of these trends (in fact, poverty fell slightly over the decade). But the effect fell
steeply after that, and by the 1990s, this factor contributed only 0.3 points to
higher poverty.
Given the policy shift emphasizing work as the primary pathway out of
poverty, this chapter focuses closely on the opportunities in the low-wage labor
market. In the latter 1990s, fast productivity growth combined with low unem-
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ployment to give a significant boost to the earnings of low-wage workers. In
fact, by comparing a few different time periods, it is clear that, by itself, fast
economic growth is unlikely to move the wages of the lowest-paid workers. In
the last five years of the 1980s business cycle, productivity grew 1.5% per year,
but average unemployment was a high 6.4%. As a result of a labor market too
slack to ensure low-wage growth, the real wages of low-paid workers barely
budged, and poverty rates were largely unresponsive to growth. Over the last
five years of the 1990s business cycle, productivity grew a point faster per year
(2.5%), and, equal1y important, average unemployment was 4.8%. Under these
conditions, 20th percentile real wages grew as employers needed to bid even
low wages up to get and keep the workers they needed to meet strong demand
in these years. In fact, low wages grew at almost the rate of productivity, an
unprecedented trend over the last 30 years, and poverty rates fel1 more quicldy
than they had in decades.
The most recent trends of low wages corroborate the view that fast produc-
tivity growth alone wil1 not suffice to fuel the growth of low wages. Between
2001 and 2003, productivity grew far more quickly than in the earlier periods
mentioned above. Yet unemployment was high, on average, compared to the
latter half of the 1990s. Under these conditions, the extra income generated by
the fast growth of productivity did not flow to low-wage workers, as earnings at
the 20th percentile slowed to 0.5% per year.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that it talces a combination of fast growth
and very low unemployment to ensure that the benefits of growth are distrib-
uted broadly enough to connect the fortunes of the poor with those of the rest of
working America. At the same time, we need to be mindful of the historically
important role of an effective safety net in a dynamic economy like that of the
United States, with business cycle downturns that can do great damage to the
living standards of the most econornical1y vulnerable among us.
Regions: labor market slump widespread in most states
While much of this book focuses on information of national scope, this chapter
examines the state ofthe economy in each of the nation's regions, Census divi-
sions (groups of states within regions), and individual states. A regional focus
is important because, in many ways, state or regional data more accurately
represent the economy faced by workers in a particular area than do broad
national data.
This chapter focuses on what happened to state labor markets between
2001 and 2003, a period of weak labor markets in nearly every state. Two years
after the recession's official end in November 2001, job growth was worse in
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39 states. By 2003, 36 states-spread out in every region and division of the
country-had fewer jobs than they did three years earlier.
The manufacturing sector was a key factor in the recession and jobless
recovery: making up 13.1 % of jobs in 2000, this industry lost 15.9% of its jobs
in the next three years, compared to slight job growth of 0.8% in the other
industries combined. Furthermore, 21 of the 36 states that had fewer jobs in
2003 than in 2000 experienced job growth outside of manufacturing. For ex-
ample, while Arkansas lost 14.2% of its manufacturing jobs, all other indus-
tries grew by 2.1 %.
As of mid-2004, the national labor market had finally started to show signs
of recovery. While this was welcome news, it comes three years after the reces-
sion started and over two years after the economy purportedly entered the re-
covery. For many states, it will take numerous consecutive months of robust
job growth to return to the employment levels of three years ago.
Not surprisingly, the recession and jobless recovery led to increased unem-
ployment. From 2000 to 2001 the unemployment rate of 16 states rose by one
percentage point or more, mostly in those states affected strongly by manufac-
turing losses, including North Carolina, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington.
By 2003, all but nine states had unemployment rates of one percentage point or
more above their 2000 rates.
Long-term unemployment rose considerably in every state except Hawaii
and Delaware between 2000 and 2003. For example, in Georgia, where the
2003 unemployment rate was lower than the national average (4.7% compared
to 6.0% nationally), the share of unemployed workers that had been unem-
ployed for more than half a year rose from 7.6% in 2000 to 27.7% in 2003.
A weak labor market affects the living standards of working families di-
rectly when workers lose jobs or are unable to find work that pays well and
offers enough hours and benefits. Another effect of high unemployment is that
workers have less bargaining power and wage growth can either decline or
disappear. After rising at an annual rate of 2.3% from 1995 to 2000, the growth
in low wages slowed to less than 1% annually from 2000 to 2003.
The federal minimum wage has not been raised since 1997. Once again,
some states have stepped in and raised their own state-level minimum wage
rates. The number of states with higher minimum wages has more than doubled,
from five in 1997 to 13 in 2004. The wage levels set by these states range from
$5.50 in Illinois to $7.16 in Washington state.
The contrast between the economy of the late 1990s and that of the last
three years was sharp in most states. Expanding payrolls, full employment, and
strong, broad-based wage growth were replaced by fewer jobs, higher unem-
ployment, and stagnating wages. A state-by-state analysis of labor markets re-
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veals that the recent slump has been uniquely geographically pervasive, but
that the pljght of the manufacturing sector has been a central factor in states
with the most severe job losses: while most states' economies have suffered in
the last three years, states with heavy reliance on manufacturing have generally
done worse.
International: beyond the U.S. model
In this chapter, the economic performance of the United States is compared to
that of 19 other rich, industrialized countries that, like the United States, be-
long to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
This analysis-which compares the U.S. economy with similar economies fac-
ing the same global conditions with respect to trade, investment, technology,
and the environment-provides an independent yardstick for gauging the
strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. economy.
In 2002, per capital income in the United States ($36,102) was greater than
that of all 19 other OECD countries ($26,680 on average). However, the gap
has been closing, as annual growth rates in per capita income are, on average,
higher in the other OECD countries (0.9%) compared to the United States (0.4%)
between 2000 and 2002.
OECD countries are also catching up and surpassing the United States in
output per hour worked. In 1950, the average of the other OECD countries
output per hour was only 41 % of the U.S. average; in 2002, the average was
88%. Additionally, the U.S. is no longer a leader in this category, as seven other
countries have surpassed the United States in terms of output.
Inequality has been and continues to be a mainstay of the U.S. economic
model. Measuring the gap between the richest and poorest workers in each
country, U.S. households at the 90th percentile had incomes that were 5.5 times
that of those at the 10th percentile. The United States had the largest gap of all
the OECD countries. The United States also reported the largest Gini coeffi-
cient (0.368), which is another measure of within-country inequality.
Supporters of the U.S. economic model generally acknowledge the relative
inequality in the United States but argue that the model provides greater mobil-
ity, greater employment opportunities, and greater dynamism than do more "in-
terventionist" economies. The evidence, however, provides little support for
this view. First, there was less mobility out of poverty in the United States than
in other nations. The U.S. percentage of people who were "always poor" is
9.5%, the highest reported figure for any OECD country. One of the most dis-
turbing statistics is the rate of childhood poverty in the United States: 21.9% of
U.S. children lived in households that faced severe financial distress, which
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was again the highest percentage for any country in this analysis. Poverty was
deeper and harder to escape in the United States and much less in the way of
adequate social policy was available relative to other GECD countries. Social
expenditures in the United States, as a percentage of gross domestic product,
were the lowest for any country.
The evidence in this chapter underscores the diversity of international ex-
perience in providing wage, income, and employment security. Many GECD
countries have economic and social policies that differ from those in the United
States and that have not been detrimental to their productivity levels. In fact, in
many cases, these alternative policies have been pursued in economies with
productivity levels that surpass U.S. levels. Such findings suggest that those
formulating policy-in both the United States and abroad-may benefit from
looking beyond the U.s. model.
Conclusion
The analyses to be found throughout this edition of The State of Working America
shed light on the economic conditions facing working families in America to-
day. The lessons are not hard to derive: the U.S. economy is capable of gener-
ating tremendous wealth, but there is absolutely no guarantee that this wealth
will reach the working families responsible for its growth. In fact, as this book
goes to press, the U.S. economy has been consistently expanding for years, yet
real wages of the middle-class working Americans have been falling, and virtu-
ally all of the growth that has occurred has flowed to profits, not to labor.
Thus, a central goal of this analysis is to identify the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions needed to ensure that economic growth is broadly shared. We
have many facts at our disposal, and these are useful in their own right, paint-
ing a detailed picture of both the historical and prevailing economic conditions
facing working families. But the many tables and figures that follow are also
instructive in pointing toward a better economy, one that lifts the living stan-
dards of all working Americans.
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